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Abstract While the importance of child education is universally recognized, there 
are still millions of children who are out of school in developing countries. In 
these countries, many children are left in the care of their kin when their parents 
die or work abroad. In this paper, we examine the welfare, particularly the school 
attendance, of the children under kinship care in the Philippines. Culled from the 
last seven rounds of an official national household survey, our dataset comprises 
1,485 households with at least two members who are 6–12 years old, and one 
of them is the household head’s child or grandchild and the other is the head’s 
kin. Applying probit regression models, we find that a child under kinship care is 
about 3 % points less likely than the head’s own child to be attending school, other 
things being constant. However, there are no statistically significant differences 
in the likelihood of school attendance between the head’s own child and grand-
child. While income deprivation keeps some children out of school, ensuring their 
schooling participation would require more transfers than are needed to lift their 
households out of poverty. Targeting these children through conditional cash trans-
fer programs could mitigate the effect of the apparent parental bias toward their 
own brood.
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13.1  Introduction
That the importance of child education is universally recognized needs no further 
proof than the fact that most countries commit to meet by 2015 the Millennium 
Development Goal #2: Achieving universal primary education. In fact, this objec-
tive is not new and has been part of the global development agenda since the pre-
vious millennium (e.g., the Education for All initiative started in the 1990s, now 
incorporated as part of the MDGs). By subscribing to the MDG #2, countries, 
thus, do more than affirm the intrinsic and instrumental value of child education. 
They also implicitly concede that it would require more than merely continuing 
previous efforts to hurdle the remaining, persistent obstacles before 2015.
While most of previous government efforts have concentrated on the supply and 
delivery of education services, increasingly the focus is now shifting toward stim-
ulating demand. For example, the school-based management programs adopted in 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Honduras, Guatemala, Senegal, and Lesotho 
are meant to engage parents and community-level stakeholders in the policy setting 
and administration of local schools. The conditional cash transfer programs now 
implemented in many Latin American, Asian, and African countries provide finan-
cial incentives to households to send and keep their young members in schools. 
While significant progress has been achieved with all the various supply-side and 
demand-side initiatives, the goal toward universal education remains elusive.
With barely 2 years left before the deadline, a UN report concedes that MDG 
#2, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is unlikely to be met despite the huge reduc-
tion in the number of out-of-school children, from 102 million in 2000 to 57 mil-
lion in 2011 (Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG Indicators 2013). Also, the 
report finds that while poverty is the biggest contributory factor that keeps children 
out of school, girls are likelier than boys to be out of school even in richer house-
holds. In Asia, where enrollment rates at the elementary level are already above 
90 %, many children, as it were, fall through the cracks not due to poverty, but 
perhaps because of parental preferences, armed conflict, or other structural factors.
In addition to the gender gap, parental bias is found to manifest according to 
the child’s work opportunities, sibship size and composition, or the spouse’s rela-
tive control over family income (e.g., Glick and Sahn 2000; Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 2000; Lee 2007; Alderman and King 1998). Concern is raised also about 
the well-being of orphaned, abandoned, or vulnerable children—estimated to be 
two million in 2009—who are placed under institutional, foster, or kinship care 
(e.g., Foster and Williamson 2000; UNICEF 2009). The effect of kinship care 
on the child’s well-being is of policy interest, especially in developing countries 
where extended family arrangements are often seen as mutual support groups and 
sources of assistance in times of social or economic distress (e.g., Desai 1992; Cox 
and Fafchamps 2007).
However, evidence on the causes, prevalence, and consequences of kinship 
care is still fragmentary. According to Children on the Brink 2003 (UNAIDS et al. 
2004), a vast majority of the orphans and children who lost at least one parent 
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to HIV/AIDS live with the surviving parent and siblings or with other relatives. 
It is estimated that in 2003, there were about 12.3 million of these children in 
sub-Saharan Africa alone. In the same year, it is estimated that Asia had about 
87.6 million orphaned children, who lost either one or both parents to HIV/AIDS 
and other causes. The same trend is noted in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
where the number of children living in formal care grew from 1,503 per 100,000 
in 2000 to about 1,738 per 1,000,000 in 2007 (UNICEF Regional Office for CEE/
CIS 2010).
There is some evidence that the education of the children under kinship care 
tends to suffer. For example, UNAIDS, UNICEF, and USAID (2004) find that 
‘the orphans in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to live in households that are 
female-headed, larger and have more people dependent on fewer  income-earners, 
and are less likely to attend school than children living with their parents.’ In 
Jamaica, children under foster care, especially boys, are less likely than their fos-
ter parents’ own children to attend school (Gibbison and Paul 2005). In their study 
of orphan enrollment using 105 nationally representative surveys, Ainsworth and 
Filmer (2006) find that ‘Children living with kin have a higher risk of not attend-
ing school than their peers who live with parents, although they are more likely to 
go to school than children living with non-kin.’
In this paper, using the Philippines data, we examine the differences in the 
school attendance rates of young children by their affinity to the household head. 
Many children in the Philippines are put under kinship care due to a large num-
ber of solo parents, broken families, and parents who work overseas as migrant 
workers. The available evidence so far concerning the welfare of these children 
is mixed. Some case studies find that the children of overseas migrant workers 
are not necessarily worse off in terms of education (Reyes 2007; Arguillas and 
Williams 2010). Using household survey data, Fujii (2011) reports that the child’s 
kinship ties to the household head matters for school attendance. We further probe 
this issue in the Philippines by applying the probit regression technique on a 
pooled survey data from the last seven rounds of an official household survey. In 
particular, we find that children under kinship care are less likely than the house-
hold head’s own children to be attending school, possibly due to low household 
income. However, it would require more transfers than is needed to get and keep 
the household out of poverty to ensure that all children, regardless of their affinity 
to the household head, are kept in school.
13.2  Differential Parental Investments in Their Children
Since parents or adult household members normally decide on the investments 
in their children’s education, their preferences and control over resources count 
for a lot in explaining the differences in the schooling participation and comple-
tion of the children. The exact reasons or motives for the differential investments, 
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however, are not easily discerned from observational data. But understanding the 
investment motives is important since they have varying policy implications.
The motives can be broadly classified as biological or economic (Bergstrom 
1997; Case et al. 2000; Plug and Vijverberg 2005). The biological argument posits 
that parents invest in their children to propagate their genetic line. The implica-
tion is that parents are likely to invest more in their genetic children than in their 
foster or adoptive children. By extension, they are likely to invest more in their 
own children or grandchildren, with whom they share more genes, than in their 
other relatives. If this is true, education policies should be targeted at households 
with children of varying degrees of affinity to the household head (or the spouse) 
to equalize the education opportunities for all children. This approach is especially 
pertinent in many developing countries where many households include multiple 
families or extended family members.
The economic motives come in two strands. The first strand posits that even 
altruistic parents faced with resource constraints may discriminate on the basis of 
their children’s differences in IQ, drive, or motivation. Therefore, parents invest 
more in the high-ability or highly driven child since it would yield the highest pay-
off for the family. The second strand assumes that parents expect their children to 
take care of them in old age. Thus, depending on their expectations, which are also 
partly conditioned by social norms, parents may invest more in the education of, 
say, their male or elder children. Which of these motivations dominate clearly has 
implications on the design of not only gender-sensitive education policies but also 
social security programs.
Teasing out the relative contributions of these motives in observed differences 
in schooling participation or completion using observational data, however, is not 
easy due to possible endogeneity or simultaneity problems. The common approach 
is to use the variations in the genetic affinity to the parents (or family decision 
makers) of the children in the same family on whom the parents presumably have 
the same economic attachments. Employing this approach, Case et al. (2000) find 
that parents in the USA and South Africa exhibit greater preference (as manifested 
in differential food consumption) for their biological children than for their step-
children. To minimize omitted variable bias, Sacerdote (2004) used data from the 
random assignment of Korean infants to American families that adopted them and 
found the health, income, and education transmissions from parents to children 
to be higher for non-adoptees than for adoptees. Also, using data of families with 
mixed children, Plug and Vijverberg (2005) found evidence that family income is 
a good predictor of education outcome for adopted children. Interestingly, Gibson 
(2009), also using data on families with both adopted and genetic children, finds 
no support for the biological motive; instead, she finds that parents provide more 
for their adopted children.
Parental investment in child education is presumed to be motivated by strong 
family orientation among Filipino households. This is taken to mean that parents 
and children are expected to take turns in caring for each other and that relatives can 
be counted on in times of need. However, validating these long-held assumptions 
is constrained by lack of suitable data. The next section describes the household 
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survey dataset that contains information on the children’s affinity to the household 
head that we used here to estimate an apparent bias against children under kinship 
care.
13.3  Household Survey Data
We culled our data from the last seven rounds of the Annual Poverty Indicators 
Survey (APIS) of the Philippines. Undertaken by the National Statistics Office, the 
APIS provides poverty-related information including household demographics, 
income and expenditures, assets and housing amenities, access to water and sanita-
tion facilities and to other social welfare programs, and each member’s employ-
ment, educational attainment, health and schooling status, and their relationship 
to the household head (Ericta and Luis 2009). It is a regular survey with nationally 
representative, random samples of about 37,500 households in the 1999 round, 
38,000 in the 2002 round, 42,800 in the 2004 round, 40,200 in the 2007 round, 
40,600 in the 2008 round, 20,000 in the 2010 round, and 42,000 in the 2011 
round. While most of the household samples in each round constitute nuclear fam-
ilies only (i.e., husband, wife, and own children), a significant proportion of them 
include extended family members or non-relatives. As shown in Fig. 13.1, these 
extended households account for about 20 % of all the samples in the first income 
quintile in all survey rounds. Noticeably, the proportion rises steadily with each 
higher income quintile in all rounds, reaching up to 45–50 % in the richest income 
quintile. These figures suggest that a lot of Filipino children are living with their 
parents and adult kin or with their adult kin alone. Further, the children in richer 
households are likelier to live with other kin (and with or without their parents). 
This dataset, therefore, allows us to investigate the possible links between a child’s 
school attendance and his or her relationship with the household head.
From each survey round, we selected household samples with extended family 
members. Specifically, we chose only those households with at least two members 
Fig. 13.1  Proportion of 
extended households by 
income per capita quintile, 
1999–2011. Source of raw 
data Annual Poverty Indicator 
Survey (various years). 
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who are 6–12 years old, one of whom is the household head’s child or grandchild, 
while the other is the head’s ‘other relative.’ The latter may be the head’s own sib-
ling, cousin, niece or nephew, or in-law. The APIS does not distinguish whether 
the reported child or grandchild is the household head’s biological or adopted 
progeny. Also, it does not distinguish the exact relationships between and among 
the head’s other relatives in the household. Thus, it is possible that the child 
reported to be the head’s other relative and the child’s own parent(s) live in the 
same household. So, in this paper, a child under kinship care is defined simply as 
a 6- to 12-year-old kid who lives in a household whose head is the child’s kin, but 
not parent or grandparent.
Accounting for about 3.4 % of the total APIS samples, our subsample consists 
of 1,485 households with 4,026 members who are 6–12 years old (Table 13.1). Of 
these school-age members, 2,301 (57 %) are the household head’s own children or 
grandchildren and the rest are the head’s other kin. Since our subsample is limited 
to extended households, most of them (99.8 %) have adult members who are the 
head’s other relatives, and some of them are possibly the parents of the child under 
kinship care.
By government policy, each 6-year-old child is expected to commence the then 
required 6-year elementary education (or 7 years in some private schools). A huge 
majority of our sample children (91–97 %) were reported to be attending school 
at the time of the surveys. We exploit the variations in the child’s schooling status, 
affinity to the head, and the household’s socioeconomic status to determine if low 
income alone prevents households from investing in their children’s education.
13.4  Empirical Framework
13.4.1  Estimating Equation
Using the aforementioned dataset, we estimate a probit regression model to tease 
out the differences in the probability of school attendance between the household 
head’s own children, grandchildren, and other kin, controlling for household income 
and other factors (Wooldridge 2002). Specifically, our estimating equation is
where Si is the observed binary indicator of school attendance of the ith child mem-
ber (aged 6–12 years old), the dummy variable grandchild indicates whether the 
member is the head’s own grandchild, other kin indicates whether the member is 
the head’s other relation (e.g., sibling, cousin, nephew/niece, in-law), log income is 
Si = α + β grandchildi + γ other kini + δ log incomei + ϕ remittance





1 if S∗ > 0
0 if S∗ ≤ 0,
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the natural logarithm of household income per capita, remittance indicates whether 
the household receives transfers from abroad, adult relatives is the number of adult 
relatives of the household head who are not the head’s spouse or own children, X 
is a vector of control variables, ε is the error term, the terms α, β, δ, ϕ, and θ are 
regression coefficients, and S* is a latent variable. In the equation above, the mem-
ber is the head’s own child if she is neither the head’s grandchild nor other kin.
To test if the probability of schooling for a child who is the head’s relative (but 
not direct descendant) improves with income, receipt of transfers from abroad, 
or the number of adult relatives of the household head, we estimated alternative 
specifications of the regression equation to include serially among the regressors 
three interaction terms: other kin × log income, other kin × remittance, and other 
kin × adult relatives. The last interaction term is used to ascertain if the child under 
kinship care is perhaps also living with his or her parent in the same household. 
Then, we use the model with the statistically significant interaction term to deter-
mine the marginal effect on the likelihood of schooling of a child placed under 
kinship care in a household with a given income level. By setting the income at dif-
ferent levels, we can then determine the changes in the marginal effects of the child 
so placed. At some level of income where the marginal effect becomes statistically 
insignificant, we are then able to identify the threshold at which the likelihood of 
school attendance is the same for all children, regardless of their relationship to the 
household head. While the same tests can be applied in the case of grandchildren, 
this is deemed unnecessary (as will be shown in the next section) since they are 
found to be no more or less likely to be in school as the head’s own children.
Possibly, there are unobserved factors that influence the probability of school 
attendance and the presence of grandchildren or other kin in the same house-
hold. Ideally, this omitted variable problem should be addressed using a family-
fixed-effect panel model or instrumental variables (to account for the presence of 
extended family members). However, using a family-fixed-effect panel model will 
result in dropping off many of the household-level variables, including income, 
remittance, and the head’s and spouse’s characteristics. Without these variables, 
however, we cannot determine the independent effects of income and parental 
preferences. To partially account for the unobserved household-level factors, we 
obtained robust standard errors adjusted for household-level clustering of our sam-
ple children (same approach as Case et al. 2000). Further, by restricting our sam-
ple households to those with extended family members, we mitigate the selection 
problem and avoid the need for an instrumental variable. We note, nonetheless, our 
estimates and their implications apply only for a select type of households and not 
to the general household population.
13.4.2  Regression Variables
Table 13.2 shows the definitions and descriptive statistics of the child-level vari-
ables for the 4,026 children in our regression dataset. The dependent variable is 
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Table 13.2  Variable definitions and summary statistics (N = 4,026)
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min Max
In school =1 if child is currently attending 
school, 0 otherwise
0.936 0.245 0 1
Grandchild =1 if grandchild of household head,  
0 otherwise
0.053 0.223 0 1
Other kin =1 if child is other relative of  
household head, 0 otherwise
0.428 0.495 0 1
Log income Natural logarithm of annual household 
income per capita
9.098 0.843 6.589 12.567
Remittance 1 = if household received remittance 
from abroad, 0 otherwise
0.202 0.402 0 1
Adult relatives Number of adult relatives of the 
household head who are not the head’s 
spouse or own children and who are 
each at least 25 years old
5.447 1.696 0 12
Child is male =1 if child is male, 0 otherwise 0.509 0.50 0 1
Age of child Age of child in years 9.17 2.00 6 12
Age of child squared Square of the child’s age in years 88.09 36.47 36 144
Child is ill or injured =1 if child is ill or injured,  
0 otherwise
0.197 0.398 0 1
Head is male =1 if household head is male,  
0 otherwise
0.844 0.362 0 1
Age of head Age of household head in years 42.98 10.75 21 87
Head has job (1999) =1 if household head (in 1999) has a 
job, 0 otherwise
0.144 0.351 0 1
Head has job (2002) =1 if household head (in 2002) has a 
job, 0 otherwise
0.129 0.336 0 1
Head has job 
(2004–2011)
=1 if household head (in 2004, 2007, 
2008, 2010, or 2011) has a job, 0 
otherwise
0.618 0.486 0 1
Head attended college =1 if household head has some  
college education, 0 otherwise
0.258 0.438 0 1
Spouse has job =1 if spouse has a job, 0 otherwise 0.474 0.499 0 1
Spouse attended college =1 if spouse has some college  
education, 0 otherwise
0.127 0.333 0 1
Head in union =1 if household head is married  
or living together with partner,  
0 otherwise, 0 otherwise
0.884 0.320 0 1
Owner =1 if household owns house and lot 
currently living in, 0 otherwise
0.656 0.475 0 1
Ilocos =1 if Ilocos region, 0 otherwise 0.034 0.181 0 1
Cagayan =1 if Cagayan region, 0 otherwise 0.032 0.177 0 1
Central Luzon =1 if Central Luzon region, 0 
otherwise
0.072 0.259 0 1
Southern Tagalog =1 if Southern Luzon region, 0 
otherwise
0.131 0.337 0 1
Bicol =1 if Bicol region, 0 otherwise 0.069 0.254 0 1
Western Visayas =1 if Western Visayas region,  
0 otherwise
0.051 0.219 0 1
(continued)
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in school whose value is 1 if the child member is currently attending school (dur-
ing the survey reference period) and 0 if not. Its mean value and standard deviation 
are 0.936 and 0.245, respectively. The main independent variables are the binary 
indicators grandchild and other kin that denote whether the member is the house-
hold head’s own grandchild and other relation, respectively. Their respective mean 
values are 0.053 and 0.428. The other principal independent variables are natural 
logarithm of annual household income per capita (log income) and a binary indi-
cator of whether the household receives transfers from abroad (remittance). The 
respective mean values of these variables are 9.098 and 0.202. We also include the 
number of adult relatives of the household head (adult relatives) who are neither 
the head’s spouse nor own children and are each at least 25 years old. On the aver-
age, there are about 5.5 adult relatives living in the same household.
Further, we characterize each child member by gender (child is male), health 
status (child is ill or injured), and age in years (age of child). Roughly, 51 % are 
male, 20 % had illness or injury, and the average age is 9 years old. To see if older 
children are more likely to drop out from school as is commonly noted in the 
Philippines, we also include the squared value of the child’s age in years (age of 
child squared).
To account for parental preferences, we include indicators of the head’s 
and spouse’s characteristics, such as gender (head is male), age (age of head), 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min Max
Central Visayas =1 if Central Visayas region,  
0 otherwise
0.063 0.242 0 1
Eastern Visayas =1 if Eastern Visayas region,  
0 otherwise
0.079 0.271 0 1
Zamboanga Peninsula =1 if Zamboanga Peninsula region,  
0 otherwise
0.061 0.240 0 1
Northern Mindanao =1 if Northern Mindanao region,  
0 otherwise
0.054 0.226 0 1
Davao =1 if Davao region, 0 otherwise 0.070 0.254 0 1
Soccsksargen =1 if region of South Cotabato,  
Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, and  
General Santos City, 0 otherwise
0.053 0.224 0 1
Cordillera =1 if Cordillera Administrative  
Region, 0 otherwise
0.038 0.191 0 1
ARMM =1 if Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao, 0 otherwise
0.025 0.156 0 1
Caraga =1 if Caraga region, 0 otherwise 0.073 0.260 0 1
Year 2002 =1 if year is 2002, 0 otherwise 0.160 0.367 0 1
Year 2004 =1 if year is 2004, 0 otherwise 0.166 0.372 0 1
Year 2007 =1 if year is 2007, 0 otherwise 0.132 0.339 0 1
Year 2008 =1 if year 2008, 0 otherwise 0.148 0.355 0 1
Year 2010 =1 if year is 2010, 0 otherwise 0.073 0.259 0 1
Year 2011 =1 if year is 2011, 0 otherwise 0.156 0.363 0 1
Table 13.2  (continued)
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employment status (head has job and spouse has job), level of education (head 
attended college, spouse attended college), and civil status (head in union). Note 
that the head’s employment status is tagged to a survey round to account for the 
different reference periods used in the 1999, 2002, and 2004–2011 rounds. Of the 
total child samples, about 84 % live in households headed by males, and less than 
15 % have household heads with a job in 1999 or in 2002, although 61 % have 
household heads that were employed during each of the later survey years. About 
a fourth (26 %) live in households with heads that had at least some college edu-
cation. A huge majority (89 %) has household heads who were either married or 
living together with a partner. Nearly half (47.4 %) belong to households where 
the spouse of the head had a job. However, only around 13 % live in households 
where the spouse had at least some college education. Around 66 % live in family-
owned houses and lots.
To account for other unobserved location-specific or year-specific factors, we 
included dummy variables for the country’s 17 administrative regions and for the 
seven survey years. For instance, the regional dummy variables should account 
for, among other things, the spatial variations in prices or costs of living, and the 
relative accessibility and quality of local public and private school facilities. The 
year dummy variables would partly account for the differences in the policies and 
provisions of education services of the past four Philippine Presidents (Ramos, 
Estrada, Macapagal-Arroyo, Aquino) and the global economic trends (and crises) 
that affected the Philippines economy during the 1997–2011 period. The default 
region is the National Capital Region (Metro Manila) and the base year is 1999.
13.5  Analysis of Results
13.5.1  Likelihood of School Attendance of Children, 
Grandchildren, and Other Kin
Table 13.3 presents four sets of probit regression results. Not including any interaction 
term among the regressors, our base model simply tests for the independent effects of 
grandchild, other kin, log of income per capita, remittance, and the number of adult 
relatives on the likelihood of school attendance. The next three models further test 
if our key independent variables have also indirect or joint effects on the same. The 
estimated joint effect will indicate the extent to which an increase in income, a receipt 
of transfers from abroad, or the number of adult relatives can together improve the 
schooling status of the other kin relative to that of the head’s own child.
Consistently in all four models, the grandchild is found to be negative, but not 
statistically significant. This implies that the head’s own child and grandchild of 
the same age cohort (6–12 years) are equally likely to be attending school, other 
things being the same. Put differently, households do not systematically discrimi-
nate between the head’s direct descendants in their schooling decisions.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24913 Does Poverty Alone Keep Children Out of …
Apparently, however, they tend to invest less in the education of the other 
type of children. Specifically, the other kin is about 3 % points less likely to be 
in school than the head’s own child, other things held constant. Further, the lower 
likelihood is highly statistically significant (p < 0.01). This does not appear to be 
greatly mitigated by higher income (Model 2), remittance from abroad (Model 3), 
or the number of adult relatives (Model 4). The average marginal effect of other 
kin in Models 2–4, which already capture the interaction effects, is still around 
3 % points and highly statistically significant (p < 0.01).
In addition to its direct impact on other kin (Model 2), income also has its 
own direct, independent effect (Model 1, Model 3, and Model 4). In all specifi-
cations, we find that a unit increase in log income raises by about 1.5 % points 
the probability of schooling. In contrast, remittance has neither a statistically sig-
nificant direct effect of child schooling nor a special impact on other kin’s (Model 
3). These results imply that it is the size rather than the source (i.e., from abroad) 
of the household income that influences schooling decisions in Filipino house-
holds. Put differently, the receipt of external transfers, which may indicate that the 
member’s parent(s) is abroad, per se does not necessarily lead to children quitting 
school, a finding consistent with those in Fujii (2011).
In all models, we also find the number of adult relatives to have direct, positive 
(0.006), and statistically significant marginal effects (p < 0.05). Its effect is not 
washed out when interacted with other kin. It could mean that these senior house-
hold members provide adult supervision on the younger members who are then 
encouraged to attend school or that, in fact, at least some of them provide parental 
care to the child under kinship care. Unfortunately, the child’s relationship with 
the adult relatives cannot be established from the data.
13.5.2  Other Factors Affecting the Probability  
of School Attendance
Table 13.3 shows the other significant factors affecting school attendance. Among 
the child-level characteristics, a boy is found to be 2.4 % points less likely than a 
girl to be attending school. An older child is likelier than a younger one to be in 
school, but less and less so as he or she becomes older. Further, their schooling 
status is not adversely affected by illness or injury.
None of the head’s characteristics seem to have any differential impact on a 
member’s schooling status. Moreover, a child’s school attendance does not appear 
to be particularly sensitive to the head’s employment status, education, or marital 
status. Also, the household’s ownership over the house and lot it currently occupies 
does not have a statistically significant differential impact. Further, the spouse’s 
educational attainment also does not seem to matter. However, school attendance 
is less likely among children where the spouse is working, other things being con-
stant. This suggests that the time spouses spend working outside the home may 
have reduced the time for parental care or adult supervision over young children.
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In general, we also find that the probability of school attendance is the same 
across regions, except in two. Relative to the children in the National Capital 
Region, those in Zamboanga Peninsula or in the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) are about 7 % points less likely to be in school. The lower 
school attendance in these regions is partly because of their relatively lower eco-
nomic conditions and high incidence of armed conflicts (Human Development 
Network 2005). Finally, the likelihood of schooling is the same across years, 
except in 2008 when it was nearly 8 % points greater than in 1999.
13.5.3  Improving the School Attendance of Children Under 
Kinship Care
We use the results of Model 2 in Table 13.3 to estimate the increase in the prob-
ability of school attendance of a child under kinship care relative to that of the 
head’s own child at various income levels. Put differently, we wish to find the level 
of income at which both types of children are equally likely to be in school, con-
trolling for other factors.
Table 13.4 presents the predicted marginal effects of other kin at various lev-
els of annual household income per capita. At the average level of income (8,955 
pesos), the resulting marginal probability is −0.029, which is near the estimate in 
Model 2. Setting the income to the equivalent of the annual poverty thresholds in 
2009 (16,815 pesos) or 2012 (18,770 pesos) will improve the marginal probability 
to −0.022 or −0.021, respectively. So, in households that are just at the threshold 
Table 13.4  Marginal effects: children under kinship care on school attendance by level of 
annual household income per capita (in pesos)
**Significant at 5 % level
1The lowest income level when the marginal effect becomes statistically insignificant
Annual household 
income per capita
Remarks Marginal effect of other kin
Estimate Delta-method  
standard errors
8,955 Mean −0.029** 0.007
16,815 2009 poverty threshold −0.022** 0.009
18,770 2012 poverty threshold 
(est.)
−0.021** 0.009
20,744 1 std. deviation above the 
mean
−0.020** 0.009
28,001 Estimated threshold 
income1
−0.017 0.010
48,050 2 std. deviations above  
the mean
−0.012 0.012
111,302 3 std. deviations above  
the mean
−0.006 0.014
286,932 Maximum −0.002 0.015
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of being poor, a child who is the head’s other kin is still less likely than the head’s 
own to be in school.
Raising the household income further to 20,744 pesos (i.e., by one standard 
deviation above the mean) will only marginally improve the likelihood of school-
ing and not totally eliminate the relative disadvantage of children under kinship 
care. These children will attain parity with the head’s own children only when the 
income reaches 28,001 pesos. In these relatively well-off households, the appar-
ent differences in the likelihood of schooling are just random errors and not statis-
tically significant. These results indicate that while poverty keeps children under 
kinship care out of school, extended households would need a big increase in 
income—by approximately three times the mean income per capita—to send and 
keep them in school.
13.6  Conclusion and Policy Implications
Controlling for household income and other factors, we find that not all school-age 
children in a typical extended Filipino family are equally likely to be attending 
school. In this paper, we find only a few factors that lead to lower probability of 
schooling. That only a few are significant provides some comfort: it means that, 
for the select households in our sample where most of the children are attending 
school, policies can be directed at these few factors to close the schooling gap.
First, we corroborate previous findings that the likelihood of schooling is higher 
for female children than male children and for younger children than for older 
children in Filipino households. The differential school attendance rates across 
gender are possible consequences of inheritance practices previously observed 
among rural families who prefer to bequeath their lands to male children and make 
their female children complete schooling (Quisumbing et al. 2004). Household 
poverty and the high costs of education have been cited as possible reasons for 
high dropout rates among older children (Capuno and Kraft 2011; Tan et al. 2011; 
Albert et al. 2012).
Second, and perhaps just as worrisome, we also find that children who are the 
head’s relatives, but not as direct descendants, are on the average about 3 % points 
less likely than the head’s own child to be attending school, a finding consistent 
with those found in other countries (Ainsworth and Filmer 2006; Gibbison and 
Paul 2005). While this apparent bias against children under kinship care can be 
overcome with income transfers, the high amount of required transfers suggest, 
however, that it is more than poverty that keeps these children out of school.
The reasons for the apparent parental bias against children under kinship care 
warrant further investigation. One plausible explanation is that parents invest less 
in their young relatives because they expect to receive less transfers from them in 
old age than from their own children. Another possibility is that their young rela-
tives have less innate abilities or motivation than their own children. Still another, 
which is perhaps particularly pertinent in the Philippines, is that kinship care is 
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disguised child labor or that the child lives with a parent who lives with and works 
for the household head. The possibility of child labor is somewhat mitigated in our 
sample since children under kinship care are still young (average age is 9.5 years) 
to be productive. However, the second arrangement—that the child’s parent works 
for the household head—seems more plausible, and if so, then the parent who has 
paid work should be able to send his or her child to school. We find a consistent, 
but not definitive result to support this hypothesis.
Notwithstanding our data limitations, what can be done to help these chil-
dren to achieve their full human development? Since these children are not out 
in the streets, in foster homes or welfare institutions, it is easy to take for granted 
that their adult relatives will treat them like their own children. That this is not 
necessarily the case demands a reassessment of social welfare programs. In the 
Philippines, the government’s conditional cash transfers program must ensure 
that the list of child beneficiaries includes all qualified extended members and not 
only the head’s own. But since the required transfers will be more than the usual 
amount of cash transfers, the conditions must be stringent to avoid moral hazard 
(i.e., leaving one’s child under kinship care) and prevent abuse.
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